Mr. Antall paints a vivid and disturbing picture of immigration enforcement in the United States, suggesting that local cooperation with federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) equates to constitutional violations. He targets Plymouth County Sheriff Joseph McDonald explicitly for continuing to house ICE detainees, accusing him of participating in unconstitutional conduct. These are serious charges. But while the rhetoric is strong, the legal foundation behind it appears to be weak or altogether absent. If the claim is that Sheriff McDonald is violating the Constitution or any federal law, Mr. Antall bears the burden of proof. Vague appeals to “due process” and dramatic comparisons to Russian military operations are not substitutes for legal citations. What specific amendment, statute, section, clause, or judicial decision is being violated?
Mr. Antall argues that ICE tactics violate due process. However, it is crucial to note that immigration enforcement is a civil, not a criminal, process. The Supreme Court has long held that immigration proceedings are civil. In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Court affirmed the federal government’s authority to detain non-citizens without individualized bail hearings during removal proceedings, stating, “Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of the process.” Therefore, while non-citizens do enjoy certain due process protections under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)), those protections are balanced against the federal government’s interest in enforcing immigration laws. Sheriff McDonald, acting under a 287(g) agreement or an intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA), is participating in a civil detention framework authorized by federal law.
A recurring point of confusion involves ICE’s use of administrative warrants rather than judicial ones. Mr. Antall claims that ICE is unlawfully apprehending individuals without judicial warrants. But the law does not require ICE to obtain judicial warrants to detain individuals for immigration violations. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a), ICE agents have the authority to arrest an alien without a warrant if they have reason to believe the person is removable. Furthermore, courts have not mandated the use of judicial warrants for ICE detainers. In El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018), the court upheld the constitutionality of honoring ICE detainers and found that “cooperation between federal and state officials is not only constitutional, but desirable.”
Another claim made by Mr. Antall is that local sheriffs should not cooperate with federal immigration authorities. However, the Constitution does not prohibit voluntary cooperation. In fact, in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), the Supreme Court held that while the federal government cannot compel state officials to enforce federal law, it did not prohibit state or local agencies from voluntarily assisting federal enforcement efforts. Sheriff McDonald’s decision to house ICE detainees under a federal contract is precisely that: voluntary cooperation. Nothing in federal law prohibits such collaboration, and no ruling or statute deems it unlawful.
Mr. Antall references instances where ICE mistakenly detained U.S. citizens. These cases are troubling, and in certain circumstances, they have resulted in lawsuits (e.g., Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015)). But these incidents represent errors by ICE, not necessarily misconduct by local sheriffs fulfilling detention contracts. If there is evidence that Sheriff McDonald personally ordered the detention or deportation of U.S. citizens or legal residents, such evidence should be produced. Otherwise, this line of argument is guilt by association.
Finally, Mr. Antall warns that Plymouth County faces legal liability for housing ICE detainees. If this were the case, it would be reflected in court filings, civil suits, or actions by the Department of Justice. Yet, to date, no court has ruled that Sheriff McDonald or Plymouth County has violated the Constitution or any federal statute by maintaining a detention agreement with ICE. Assertions of liability without legal citations or case law are speculative at best. Debates over immigration policy and enforcement are vital in a democratic society. But when accusations of constitutional violations are made, they must be supported by law, not just passion. Sheriff McDonald’s cooperation with ICE may be politically unpopular in some circles, but it does not, on its face, constitute a legal or constitutional violation.
Once again, Mr. Antall, if you are certain that Sheriff McDonald is violating the Constitution, please cite the specific amendment, section, clause, statute, or judicial ruling that supports this claim. Until then, your accusations remain unproven.
– Christopher Wright